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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES

A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW COMPETITION
POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
Ignacio De Le6n*
I.

WHY DO WE NEED A NEW POLICY FOR THE PROMOTION OF
COMPETITION IN LATIN AMERICA?

Antitrust policy is currently being acknowledged as the
optimal policy of the "second generation" of institutional reforms for developing competition in Latin America. However,
those who support the policy take this claim too lightly. Little
discussion has taken place on the goals that the policy should
seek in the region, and indeed, on the convenience of the policy
itself.
Specifically, the discussion about the goals of antitrust
normally spins around the optimal resource allocation that its
enforcement should accomplish. Some authors think that economic efficiency (most often, in the sense of Pareto) is the
"right" goal to accomplish; thus antitrust policy should protect
consumer welfare above all.' In essence, these scholars would
advocate a kind of competition policy that forbids cartels and
horizontal restraints, whereas they would propose a more lenient attitude towards other market restrictions. Others think
that antitrust policy conveys a political appraisal and therefore, active prosecution should be taken in favor of small and
medium firms competing in the market regardless of their

t These articles are based on presentations at the Second Annual Latin
American Competition and Trade Round Table at the University of Miami Law
School at Coral Gables.
* Superintendent, Office for the Promotion and Protection of Competition,
Caracas, Venezuela. The opinions of the author do not necessarily follow those of
the Superintendency.
1. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY OF WAR
WITH ITSELF 82-89 (1978).
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efficiency. The focus of enforcement should therefore be on the
"market structures" that limit competition, most often found in
concentrated markets, as well as in those markets featured by
the presence of "dominant" firms.
However, regardless of the particular social welfare goal
sought, these appraisals suffer from the same shortcoming:
they all measure the success of the policy in terms of its capacity to achieve a desired market allocation. Consequently, they
do not question whether such resource allocation is identifiable
by antitrust authorities, or indeed, whether it is desirable at
all. This Article contends that it is futile to identify "predetermined" market outcomes as a basis for designing regulatory
policies such as antitrust. Markets evolve according to ends
that are not sought by anyone; therefore, they cannot be construed according to the particular goals shared by some authority. It does not matter whether such authority represents
some political will embodied in a particular "social welfare
goal" such as Pareto efficiency or any other. Markets do not
fulfill anybody's aims, as they integrate the desires and needs
of a plurality of individuals, each seeking their own ends and
goals.
In fact, the important question is whether seeking a particular goal hampers the process that characterizes market
functioning. This Article explores the reasons why conventional
regulation focused on a variant of social resource allocation
such as antitrust policy is unfit to address the dynamics of
market functioning.
To understand these issues, this Article examines the
conventional setting where ideas about markets and firms
flourished, giving antitrust law and policy its theoretical foundations. Antitrust principles emerged out of a self-contained
idea of markets where the social observer has all the relevant
information necessary to achieve "social optimum." Next, it
emphasizes the epistemological flaws of this perspective, by
underlining the subjective and evolutionary essence of entrepreneurial knowledge about markets. These shortcomings pave
the way for formulating an alternative perspective of markets
grounded on evolution and change. Using this perspective, it
then examines market arrangements currently regarded as
"restrictive," particularly in the wake of the experience of Latin
America's recent institutional reforms (apertura).Last, it identifies a set of guidelines to consider in drafting an alternative
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competition policy for the region, based on the protection of
individual rights and institutional transparency.

II. THE ROLE OF PARADIGMS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE
EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF ANTITRUST THEORY

It is important to realize that in social sciences the search
for scientific truth is not impartial, but conventional. Alfred
Eichner explains that "scientific truth" in social sciences (i.e.,
economics) is determined by the particular "epistemology" chosen, which is comprised by a particular set of conventions
telling how to seize "knowledge"-what is "true" and what is
"false."2 As Thomas Kuhn argues, the search for "scientific
truth" is not an impartial quest for ascertaining "objective
truth."3 Rather, the scientific community behaves as "a political community seeking to impose order."4 Antitrust law and
policy is rooted in the "neo-classical" economic paradigm that
has dominated the landscape of economic theory since the
formalist revolution of the 1930s. 5 This conventional appraisal,
which may well be called "mainstream," depicts firms and markets as separate and closed-ended entities unconnected with
each other. This revolution in economic theory led economists
to change their prior appraisal of markets and firms, and to
visualize them henceforth through mathematical models of
equilibrium.6
In this conventional view, markets are seen as conveying
the forces of demand and supply. These forces eventually converge into a point of static equilibrium, where market allocation is optimal, and markets rest at perfect competition. Other
markets may not be in equilibrium, but they are examined in
reference to it, as being closer or more distant from this "ideal"
state. Therefore, they are visualized as self-contained entities,

2. Alfred S. Eichner, Why Economics is Not Yet a Science, in WHY ECONOMICS IS NOT YET A SCIENCE 205, 206 (Alfred S. Eichner ed., 1983).
3. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
4. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 32 (1992).

5. See Peter J. Boettke, Where Did Economics Go Wrong? Equilibrium as a
Flight from Reality, 11 CRITICAL REV. 11, 16 (1997).
6. For information about the formalist revolution of neo-classical thinking and
its effects on economic theory, see FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMICS 161 (1995). See also Boettke, supra note
5, at 17.
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where forces are examined through the eyes of an omniscient
social observer who knows all the relevant information and the
social goals to be achieved.
The use of equilibrium as a heuristic tool of analysis has
numerous caveats which cast doubt on its usefulness as an
instrument for understanding how markets function properly.
Unfortunately, these limitations have often been left aside by
scholars, who have shown an immoderate tendency for avoiding questioning mainstream economic analysis at its very
heart. Perhaps the most important of these shortcomings is the
lack of realism that equilibrium introduces into economic analysis. This lack of realism is not addressed by the conventional
positive method, which is more interested in predicting unknown future market outcomes than explaining past economic
causalities. It should be remembered that Milton Friedman's
analysis disregarded the truth of the assumptions upon which
a given theory is grounded as a basis for ascertaining scientific
truth in social sciences in general, and in economics in particular.' Hence, a theory is useful, and its conclusions accurate, as
long as it is capable of giving better predictions as evidenced
through empirical evidence.'
Unfortunately, this particularway of approaching market
causalitiesdoes not consider that human beings do not behave
according to regular patterns. As Isaiah Berlin stressed, human beings (whose interaction constitutes the subject matter of
the social sciences) are self-interpreting creatures: "Men's beliefs in the sphere of conduct are part of their conception of
themselves and others as human beings; and this conception in
its turn, whether conscious or not, is intrinsic to their picture
of the world."9 Hence, their appraisal of reality tends to be
biased by their particular beliefs and thoughts. For the same
7. Friedman argues that it is irrelevant whether the assumptions of positive
models are real or fictitious; what is relevant is that they can provide us with
proper predictions of what would happen in reality if other conditions remained
constant. The purpose of positive models is not to depict reality as it is, but to
create a tool to understand how individuals behave "as if' certain forces are guiding their action. In other words, they are nothing but models, which were never
intended to become normative references for measuring reality. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3,
40-41 (1953).

8. See id.
9. Isaiah Berlin, Does Political Theory Still Exist?, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS
AND SOCIETY 1, 13 (Peter Laslett & W. G. Runciman eds., 1962).
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reason, it is impossible to know exactly when in the evolutionary process of reality the analyst should focus his attention in
an attempt to draw meaningful conclusions from empirical
evidence gathered from such reality.10
Markets are comprised by the interaction of people; thus,
their substratum is provided by the thoughts and beliefs (i.e.,
knowledge) of such people, rather than by empirical objective
data (i.e., information). Therefore, any analysis of such processes must be suited to this particular setting, which is far from
objective, static or predictable.
Examining markets through "equilibrium" (or in terms of
how distant reality is from it) is insufficient to understand
their nature. To ensure the validity of the knowledge gained
through a given theory, it is necessary that the latter retains
at least one connection with observable reality. Unfortunately,
due to the equilibrium perspective, conventional mainstream
theories about markets and competition disregard this essential condition.
In his pioneering work Information and Investment, G. B.
Richardson touches upon this essential limitation." Richard-

10. In the words of Lachmann:
[H]ow can a system of pure logic, like that of the logic of choice [charac-

terizing market phenomena], provide factual knowledge? The answer
follows from the essence of my thesis: the distinction between logic and
factual knowledge is justified in the realm of nature, where no meaning
is directly accessible to us, and in which care must thus constantly be
taken to distinguish between our concepts and reality. In the realm of
human action it is different. Here such a distinction seems unjustified.
On the one hand we are unable to verify or falsify our schemes of
thought as hypotheses by predicting concrete events. Scientific tests are
not available to us since they require a complete description of that concrete "starting position" in which the test is to take place. Every human
action, however, depends on the state of knowledge of the actors. A verification test therefore would require an exhaustive description of the
state of knowledge of all actors, also according to the mode of distribution-an obvious impossibility. Otherwise, however, the starting position
is not exactly defined, and no real test is possible.
In economics this means that every concrete transaction depends,
among other things, on the expectations of the participants. To test an
economic theory in concreto, we must, then, be able, at the point of time
of theory formulation, to predict the expectations of economic agents at
the (future) point of time of the verification test.
Ludwig M. Lachmann, The Significance of the Austrian School of Economics in the
History of Ideas, in CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS, AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON
THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY 45, 57-58 (Walter E. Grinder ed., 1977).
11. G. B. RICHARDSON, INFORMATION AND INVESTMENT: A STUDY IN THE WORK-
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son emphasizes how the premises which prevail under equilibrium are indeed inconsistent with the conditions that should
prevail in order to reach sulch a state. 12 The models simply assume that equilibrium is "there," already achieved within the
model by perfectly informed entrepreneurs. 3 It does not tell
how imperfectly informed entrepreneurs conduct themselves in
order to gather such information, thus pushing the economic
system into a position of equilibrium. 4
Indeed, markets evolve, since knowledge held by its participants changes; they are not predictable settings that a social
observer can direct towards definite ends. For this reason,
viewing reality as existing in equilibrium diverts the attention
of the analyst from the very problem faced by society, which is
after all the essential trait of reality, namely, what individuals
do to achieve equilibrium. As Richardson argues:
[Bly neglecting the whole problem of information, the perfect
competition model condemns itself not only to unrealism but
to inadequacy even as a hypothetical system. It is no defense
to appeal, moreover, to the analogy of mechanical statics
which, though neglecting friction, can still identify the equilibrium position of a system of forces, for we cannot demonstrate that economic systems have such positions of rest
without reference to expectations and information which
could not be presumed to be available in the absence of restraints.5
By examining reality under the lens of an equilibrium analysis, mainstream theories inevitably avoid the problem of how
individuals reach equilibrium, which is simply assumed.
As a result, mainstream scholars developed competing
hypotheses about why markets have shifted away from equilibrium. Markets were not in equilibrium because they were
"concentrated," because entrepreneurs "created" entry barriers
to other entrepreneurs, had "monopolistic" intentions, and the
like. Consequently, the explanation (i.e., why observed markets
were not in equilibrium) was regarded to be the explanation of

ING OF THE COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (1960).

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
See
See
Id.

at 1, 4.
id. at 4.
id. at Preface.
at 69.
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the causalities itself.
No one explained market causalities or how individuals
interacted in their real transactions. Not surprisingly, under
conventional economic appraisal "[t]here is not one model, not
one argument in economic theory, which-when taking into
account entrepreneurship, innovations, and chance-would
relate structure to performance and anti-competitive conduct,
and which, in particular, would suggest viewing with suspicion
even a persistent positive correlation between 'profits' and
concentration." 6 It is clear that there is no such thing as a
unique economic theory explaining what conduct is
anticompetitive and why, because of this "shrill cacophony of
divergent opinion[s]."

7

More importantly, in the realm of antitrust theory, equilibrium misleads the social observer into making normative conclusions about the way in which markets should be organized.
Achieving equilibrium thus became crucial to the normative
appraisal of the notion of market competition. If the appropriate conditions of equilibrium hold (i.e., perfect information,
decentralized markets, many buyers and sellers) the market
mechanism yields the best possible welfare results. As Boettke
explains, this created the setting for the "market failure" logic,
because "[uInless the strict conditions required for general
competitive equilibrium were met, the economic theorist could
not, with any confidence, make pronouncements about the efficiency of market allocations. In fact, she could be confident
that the market would yield suboptimal results that demanded
corrective government action." 8
In light of these limitations, one wonders whether the
conventional equilibrium heuristics are capable of delivering
meaningful explanations about the way markets function, and
about their by-products: competition, innovation, entrepreneurship, and so on. Perhaps, as Stigler contends: "The limitations
of [mainstream economics] in dealing with conditions of persistent and imperfectly predicted change will not be removed

16. Reuven Brenner, Market Power: Innovations and Anti-trust, in THE LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION POLICY 179, 196 (Frank Mathewson et al. eds.,
1990).
17. WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS ON TRIAL: A
DIALOGUE ON THE NEW LAISSEZ-FAIRE xi (1991).
18. Boettke, supra note 5, at 20.
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until economics possesses a developed theory of change."19
Such a theory of change has begun to emerge in the writings of an increasing group of economists and social scientists
that belong to an emerging trend of scholars who are more
interested in the effects of disequilibrium, evolution and
change on the creation of social rules, institutions and organizations. 20 Such a scientific project involves several explanations on the behavior of firms, currently known as "market
process" theories.2 ' These theories are based upon the evolutionary, post-Marshallian and Austrian schools of economic
theory in the field of industrial organization, market theory,
and the theory of the firm.
In the context of market analysis, which is the key to
formulating an alternative competition policy to conventional
antitrust policy, they consider firms as evolving entities of
unpredictable boundaries, which enter into cooperation arrangements with other firms to achieve productive purposes.2 3
Individuals act on their expectations, which can be either reinforced or eroded by the prevailing institutional (formal and
informal) setting. Hence, entrepreneurs will seek to develop
means to reinforce these expectations. They may observe what
patterns characterize business relationships in a given market;
they may develop contractual bonds with other entrepreneurs,
or simply acquire stock for ensuring a relationship with suppliers or distributors firms regarded as "strategic." They may
develop a reputation, which reinforces a pattern of behavior
from clients and customers, etc.
These links are important because they will provide the
necessary assurance that productive investments can be undertaken without a significant degree of loss. Investment decisions
made today determine the level of future production outputs.
From the perspective of the social observer these business

19. George J. Stigler, Competition, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 531, 535 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
20. For a summary of the literature on evolutionary economics, postMarshallian and Austrian schools of economics, see Nicolai J. Foss, Austrian and
Post-MarshallianEconomics: The Bridging Work of George Richardson, in ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES AND CO-ORDINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF G. B.
RICHARDSON 138 (Nicolai J. Foss & Brian J. Loasby eds., 1998).
21. See id. at 140, 143-44.
22. See id. at 143-44.
23. See id. at 151.
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decisions may be "right" or "wrong," but at the micro level
entrepreneurs can reduce the likelihood of errors by constraining the expected behavior and independence of action of other
entrepreneurs. Obviously, in the conventional framework of
equilibrium, this conduct always appears as departing from
"equilibrium," or as keeping markets away from it. However,
under an alternative perspective characterized by evolving
relationships and an uncertain future, they may represent the
only way out of sheer uncertainty. Thus, they may be crucial
for producing investments.
Joseph Schumpeter clearly saw this problem in the analysis of regulators toward markets:
First, since we are dealing with a process whose every
element takeg considerable time in revealing its true features
and ultimate effects, there is no point in appraising the performance of that process ex visu of a given point of time; we
must judge its performance over time, as it unfolds through
decades or centuries ....
Second, since we are dealing with an organic process,
analysis of what happens in any particular part of it-say, in
an individual concern or industry-may indeed clarify details
of mechanism but is inconclusive beyond that. Every piece of
business strategy acquires its true significance only against
the background of that process and within the situation created by it. It must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of
creative destruction; it cannot be understood irrespective of it
or, in fact, on the hypothesis that there is a perennial lull.24
For this reason:
[Antitrust] economists who, ex visu of a point of time, look for
example at the behavior of an oligopolist industry... and
observe the well-known moves and countermoves within it
that seem to aim at nothing but high prices and restrictions
of output are making precisely that hypothesis. They accept
the data of the momentary situation as if there were no past
or future to it and think that they have understood what
there is to understand if they interpret the behavior of those
firms by means of the principle of maximizing profits with
reference to those data. The usual theorist's paper and the

24. JOSEPH A. ScHUtiPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83-84 (3d

ed. 1950).
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usual government commission's report practically never try to
see that behavior, on the one hand, as a result of a piece of
past history and, on the other hand, as an attempt to deal
with a situation that is sure to change presently-as an attempt by those firms to keep on their feet, on ground that is
slipping away from under them. In other words, the problem
that is usually being visualized is how capitalismadministers
existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it
creates and destroys them. As long as this is not recognized,
the investigator does a meaninglessjob. As soon as it is recognized, his outlook on capitalistpractice and its social results
changes considerablyY
Schumpeter concludes:
In analyzing such [restrictive] business strategy ex visu of a
given point of time, the investigating economist or government agent sees price policies that seem to him predatory
and restrictions of output that seem to him synonymous with
loss of opportunities to produce. He does not see that restrictions of this type are, in the conditions of the perennial gale,
incidents, often unavoidable incidents, of a long-run process
of expansion which they protect rather than impede. There is
no more of paradox in this than there is in saying that motorcars are traveling faster than they otherwise would because
they are provided with brakes.26
Under a perspective of markets subject not to certain
structures, but to an evolutionary process, it is easier to give a
different normative explanation of market arrangements such
as vertical restraints, horizontal agreements, and mergers,
otherwise condemned under antitrust theory. This provides an
alternative appraisal of those institutional arrangements entered into by Latin entrepreneurs in the context of apertura,7
and casts doubts on the convenience of enforcing conventional
antitrust law upon them. Let us now turn to this point.

25. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 88.
27. See Henry G6mez, The Globalization of Business in Latin America, 39
INTI EXECuTIvE 225, 228-29 (1997).
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III. TOWARDS A NEW NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF MARKET
"RESTRICTIVE" BUSINESS PRACTICES

Contrary to the omniscience that mainstream economic
analysis assumes among market participants, the fact remains
that participants lack information about the future conditions
that could influence their economic behavior. Instead, their
activity is constantly pervaded by a "fog of ignorance," subjecting them to speculate about how the future will affect them. At
most, they are guided by former experience, from which they
learn to grasp likely trends or to identify possible future outcomes, but in making their plans they will never know for
sure. Therefore, they will always face sheer uncertainty about
the future. Individually considered, each entrepreneur ignores
the actions of his peers; therefore, his actions cannot be more
than a mere tentative inquiry into an uncertain future. In the
light of this subjective reality based on conjectures, entrepreneurs are forced to seek and ensure information enough to
encourage them to make investments today related to future
production outputs, notwithstanding that knowledge is never
fully unfolded
and therefore, uncertainty will stubbornly reap28
pear.
In particular, firms are constantly forced to weigh the level

28. Perhaps the best example of the "genuine" uncertainty surrounding those
decisions taken on the basis of mere expectations was given by Keynes in his
famous "Beauty Contest" example. The speculative essence of the decisions market
participants adopt in their transaction is similar to that of a beauty contest whose
winner is chosen according to the reciprocal expectations of the deciding judges.
Under Keynes' example, each judge casts his vote according to what he regards
other members of the jury will decide, but since none of the judges possess certainty as to the decision of the rest, because the latter will be based on subjective
expectations, not on objective fact, their decision will inevitably be based on sheer
or genuine uncertainty. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 156 (1965). In the event of sheer uncertainty,
any decision to stop guessing is either arbitrarily chosen by a superior authority,
or decided by convention among market participants. As O'Driscoll and Rizzo argue: "[Tihere is in principle no limit to the height of the levels of guessing and
counterguessing. There is no logically sufficient reason to stop at any given point;
all such stopping is, to a large extent, arbitrary or dervied [sic] from a convention." GERALD P. O'DRISCOLL, JR. & MARIO J. RIZZO, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND
IGNORANCE 73 (1985). In the case of market transactions, these conventions sometimes adopt the form of explicit co-operation through manifold arrangements, or by
tacit understanding whereby one firm appraises those elements giving shape to her
expectations about other firms: reputation, former business behavior, and so on.
We shall return to this question more extensively below.
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of inputs they must invest today to reach an expected level of
future aggregate demand. A problem arises, however, because
any determination about future levels of aggregate demand
will necessarily be speculative: nobody can foresee the future
with certainty. Yet, firm managers cannot avoid deciding the
amount of investments they must undertake today to satisfy
their predicted level of future aggregate demand." This trialand-error process constantly forces them to experiment with
different investment alternatives; obviously, these decisions
are never similar to one another since particular circumstances
of time and place change. Entrepreneurship demands that
attention be paid to new opportunities. Entrepreneurs must be
"alert," in Kirznerian terms." Such new circumstances will
"tell" them that certain techniques will prevail or that other
techniques will replace them, or that consumers will change
their preferences or that they will keep them."' In sum, new
circumstances will present entrepreneurs with the dilemma of
raising (or lowering) their levels of investment to meet future
demands.
Therefore, entrepreneurs cooperate to reduce the waste
resulting from mistakes they could make due to false or incomplete information. To do so, they enter into a trial-and-error
process enabling them to "discover" which of their initial expectations are worth holding onto, as they correspond their actions to the facts that actually emerged as time passes and the
future unfolds. It is convenient to distinguish here between the
expectations related to future facts that could emerge from
natural events and the expectations pertaining to future facts
which will result from human action. It is possible to ascertain
the frequency of the former by determining their actuarial
probabilities; entrepreneurs resort to insurance in order to
cover their activities from such risks. In the case of future
circumstances associated with expected human action, however, things are not so simple. It is not possible to subject the
behavior of human beings to any regularities or predictable
pattern, for they constantly rearrange and redefine their goals
and objectives as new information emerges, leading them in
turn to reconsider their actions at each point in time.32
29.
30.
31.
32.

See RICHARDSON, supra note 11, at 29-46.
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 146 (1973).
See id.
For this reason, it is not possible to cover the risks of these possible facts

19991 PROPOSAL FOR NEW COMPETITIONPOLICY

287

Entrepreneurs build up mutual expectations through certain arrangements aimed at providing assurances about their
future actions.3 3 For example, they rely on their own past
trading experience; alternatively, they base their judgment on
the reputation of a given entrepreneur, (thus reflecting the
trading experience of other entrepreneurs).34 Finally, they
may resort to contractual means to ensure a willingness to
comply with the expectations raised. If contracts are unavailable for some reason, then parties align their conduct to
that of other entrepreneurs on the basis of what they expect
from them, and so on.35 These arrangements, as well as many
others, although less reliable than contracting insurance, nevertheless provide entrepreneurs with sufficient certainty to
encourage them to make investments today which will affect
future production levels. Obviously, all these techniques limit
the possibilities for entrepreneurs to take alternative---"independent"--paths, but the limitation introduced is
not the result of attempts to monopolize markets, but rather to
coordinate activities in such a way as to forestall future losses
due to possible errors in forecasting.
Indeed, as Richardson argues, entrepreneurs negotiate
different arrangements to reduce their uncertainty and make
more accurate forecasts depending on whether the activities
they undertake are competitive or complementary.3 6 In the
case of competitive activities, the increase in the level of investment made by one firm negatively affects the rest, since
the resulting increase in its future output will likely reduce the
possibilities of other firms to increase production.37 Here Richardson compares these investments to a particular kind of
lottery, from which firms will reap benefits if the total level of
present investment does not exceed the total amount of future
demand, but from which they will bear losses if they exceed
such amount.3" How can entrepreneurs ensure that they will
invest an optimal (ceiling) amount today? In the case of com-

with insurance. See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT
(1964).
33. See RICHARDSON, supra note 11, at 51-53.
34. See id. at 53.
35. See id. at 52.
36. Id. at 50-51.
37. See id. at 49.
38. Id. at 50.
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plementary investments, a similar uncertainty arises. Indeed,
in this case, the investments made by one firm making complementary investments to another will encourage the latter to
invest only if the first commits itself to a minimum level of
investment. How is it possible to ensure those firms will stick
to the expectations they raise in others that invest such a
minimum?
The answer is that entrepreneurs sometimes must limit
their own independence in order to create reliable institutional
settings. This will create a climate of supportive self-reinforcing mutual expectations, inducing firms to make adequate
present investments. This is not to say that limiting the independence of entrepreneurs necessarily limits their freedom to
trade. Freedom would be possible if entrepreneurs had feasible
alternative courses of action; yet this is not the case. Entrepreneurs have no real choice in deciding whether they should
align their own conduct to that of the rest; it is the only way
they have to determine whether they should or should not
invest. This conclusion by no means implies that rivalry ("dynamic competition") is excluded altogether, since in the end the
future is unknown. The inevitable emergence of unseen new
opportunities will create gaps of knowledge which more aggressive and alert entrepreneurs will seize, inducing the rest to
follow. Parallel conduct, for example, provides entrepreneurs
with some degree of expectation about the future conduct of
others, but it does not imply that they should be limited to
such conduct if circumstances change or new opportunities
arise. A similar caveat applies to the rest of these techniques.
In the long run, output-restricting policies of firms are less
important, because innovation will render them obsolete and
acquire a stabilizing role. Restricting output (which leads to
economic profit) can be a way of compensating for uninsurable
risk. Insurance is normally included in costs, but allowances
for uninsurable risks are not, thus making prices appear to be
above costs. Some firms will fail to avoid the uninsurable risk,
and will incur losses, while others will achieve profits. Horizontal agreements and parallel conducts may be useful tools to
"homogenize" the global amount of investment required to
provide optimal supply in a given industry. Also, business
reputation may be regarded as "intangible capital" upon which
firms project their expectations to warrant their business in
relatively short-term exchanges. Finally, distribution or supply
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agreements, joint ventures, mergers and vertical integration
may be adequate means to ensure the stability of complementary activities in the long run.
Again, Richardson has examined the array of arrangements that entrepreneurs negotiate to deal with sheer uncertainty.3 9 He classifies organizations on different levels. On one
level, there is "a trading relationship between two or more
parties which is stable enough to make demand expectations
more reliable, and thereby to facilitate production planning."4
This is the simplest form of inter-firm cooperation. In this case,
the relationship "may acquire its stability merely from goodwill
or from more formal arrangements such as long-term contracts
or shareholding."4 ' The selection of any of these arrangements
is a matter of qualitative rather than quantitative coordination. The habit of working with models which assume a fixed
list of goods may be responsible for the lack of consideration of
qualitative coordination and for encouraging us to think merely "in42terms of the balancing of quantities of inputs and outputs."

Second, one firm may subcontract another by outsourcing.
This modality is becoming quite popular for cooperation between firms located in different countries.43 Subcontracting
does not in itself imply much cooperation, and may be the
result of competitive bidding. Stability arises from the fact that
subcontractors assume the risks inherent to their narrow specialization in skills and equipment, and from the fact that it
permits continued cooperation between those concerned with
the development of specifications, processes and designs.
Third, firms may cooperate and rely on each other for
manufacturing or marketing. These relationships may entail
complex patterns of coordinated activity, ranging from quantities demanded (promoting quantitative adjustment of supply to
demand), to qualitative standards involving processes or products.
Finally, there are "co-operative arrangements specifically

39.
(1972).
40.
41.
42.
43.

G. B. Richardson, The Organization of Industry, 82 ECON. J. 883-896
Id. at 884-885.
Id. at 885.
Id.
See id.
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contrived to pool or transfer technology."44 These agreements
are commonly based on the licensing or pooling of patents, but
they provide for the provision or exchange of knowhow through
the transfer of knowhow, personnel, drawings and tools. They
are normally associated "with price agreements, market sharing and the like."45
The particular shape given to these organizations results
from the conditions imposed on them by the market in which
entrepreneurs operate. The "inner intentions" of entrepreneurs
to engage in unfair restrictive trade practices is not an explanation that could deal satisfactorily with the presence of the
vast array of conducts and arrangements. Rather, the choice of
these arrangements depends on the level of information they
are supposed to convey, which is contingent upon the perception that each entrepreneur holds of those others with whom
he deals (trusts) and with the complexity of the productive
processes involved in the particular activity. In other words,
organizational choice is constrained by the length of the relationship (as new circumstances emerge) and complexity of
knowledge (as knowledge of other realities encourages the
revision of initial plans). Information costs in this subjective
sense are therefore essential in shaping the particular organization sought by entrepreneurs. The optimum size of a firm
will be determined not so much by the scale of economies associated with any particular operation, but by the number of
complementary operations requiring planned coordination. The
length of time required for productive purposes and the complexity of production are ultimately responsible for the size and
shape of inter-firm cooperation.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF APERTURA IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF
LATIN AMERICAN MARKET INSTITUTIONS
Following these ideas, it is possible to characterize those
arrangements entered into by Latin American firms in the
context of aperturaas efficient means of dealing with the characteristic institutional uncertainty and the unenforceability of
the rule of law pervading the region.4 6

44. Id. at 886.
45. Id.
46. See G6mez, supra note 27, at 228-29.
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For more than a decade now, the region has undergone
economic and trade reform, commonly known as apertura
("opening").47 The new development strategy, implemented in
the mid-1980s, was justified by the need to foster modern economies in the region. Latin American governments were thereby
induced to adopt, some more reluctantly than others, pro-market measures that were unthinkable in the past such as: inflation control, trade and foreign exchange liberalization, lifting of
regulatory measures, price controls, and elimination of restrictions on foreign investments (to name a few). Today the first
generation of macroeconomic restructuring, consisting of trade
reform, correcting fiscal imbalances, privatizing state assets,
and implementing sound monetary policies has been achieved
in many Latin countries.4 8 Above all, aperturais a process of
institutional reform.4"
In the context of such reform, entrepreneurs sought new
business opportunities in the region. In this respect, the
INTERMAN Management Innovation Programme has identified several features that summarize many of these new and
innovative forms of doing business in Latin America. 0 These
features have evolved out of the institutional uncertainties
surrounding business activity in the region, which in part arise
from problems created by the lack of infrastructure for trade in
Latin America.5 In particular, the lack of global channels,

47. See id. at 229.
48. See id. at 226-27.
49. G6mez explains the implications of this policy turnaround:
Latin America's economic and commercial reform, a common strategy known as apertura, has been applied by countries throughout the
region but in varying degrees of depth, with Chile performing the two
roles of pioneer and champion ....
The most striking effect of deploying the apertura strategy lies in
commercial and exchange policy. Import duties were cut dramatically,
from an average of 50 percent ad valorem to 15 percent in only five
years. Most notably, these cuts were applied unilaterally, with no demands for reciprocity, wiping out as well, a wide array of non-tariff barriers. Exchange controls long in use were scrapped or pared to curb capital outflows.
Id. at 228-29. A summary of the measures comprising the "second generation of
reforms" is found in MOIStS NAIM, LATIN AMERICA'S JOURNEY TO THE MARKET:
FROM MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS TO INSTITUTIONAL THERAPY 1-7 (1995).
50. See Gdmez, supra note 27, at 226.
51. See id.
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favorable logistics, and information technology has forced firms
to seek ways to overcome these constraints. G6mez comments:
"In Latin America, securing adequate distribution for consumer products can represent a challenging management task;
logistics represents more of a barrier than a driving force; and
information technology, including communications, has only
recently begun to contribute to internationalizing the region's
business."52
Furthermore, the lack of certainty and reliable expectations about legal regulation has often made Latin American
firms turn to alternative means of enhancing their expectations, rather than those conventionally acknowledged in business practice elsewhere. The problems of currency volatility
and about-turns in economic policy experienced in the region
have frequently caused havoc in the management of multinational firms. For these reasons, to offset the uncertainties of
official decisions, firms in Latin America resort to a variety of
devices to ensure their markets. For example, they use family
ties in business, seek more flexible management, use informal
links, and develop a managerial capacity for influencing official
institutions to create more predictable and reliable government
decisions.
Family links often provide a reliable source of mutual
trust in business. As Ddvila and G6mez Samper argued in
their study conducted on Latin American management: "[the
majority of] Latin American owned innovative firms are medium size (i.e., employ from 300 to 800 persons), are often family
run, and have proven proactive vis-h-vis the region's economic,
social, and political turbulence." 3
Making business relationships flexible, so as to "open"
them to changing circumstances, has also proved to be efficient
in this context. G6mez explains the conclusions of a study on
highly successful Latin firms, which revealed a degree of informality in management styles in some Brazilian, Colombian
and Venezuelan organizations which differed from the explanations formulated by conventional theories.54 The informality is

52. Id. at 233-34.
53. Carlos Divila & Henry G6mez Samper, Innovative Management and Organizational Development in Latin America, 36 INT'L EXEcUTIWE 671, 675 (1994)
[hereinafter Divila & Samper].
54. G6mez, supra note 27, at 244.
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related in these cases to "novel property and organizational
structures, effective empowerment strategies, unconventional
organizational missions, and deliberate efforts to build on
culture-specific idiosyncrasies [sic] .
Using informal links has also become important in reducing uncertainty.
For some Latin American firms, making good use of the informal market became a way for building home market as well
as export sales. Canels, for example, has become Mexico's
second largest chewing gum manufacturer by focusing its
distribution effort largely on the informal sector. Leonisa, a
Colombian lingerie manufacturer, came to dominate the market for its product line in nearby countries chiefly by building
and carefully monitoring, in each country, its informal sector
wholesale and retail network.56
Moreover, "[l]eading firms have in some cases developed
alliances with counterpart firms in neighbor[ing] countries as a
way for breaking into each other's market."5 7 For example,
multinational companies frequently buy local firms with an
established customer base.55 Switzerland's Nestld acquired
Venezuela's Savoy, a large local firm with a good reputation in
the Venezuelan confectionery market.59 Alpina, a Colombian
firm, initiated exports of its dairy products to Venezuela by
reaching a mutual marketing agreement with Plumrose, a
Venezuelan meat processor. ° Commenting on this operation,
G6mez contends that "[bioth firms produce premium quality
products, and both benefit from the agreement by relying on
each other's extensive retail distribution network, rendering
channels more efficient by adding new and complementary
lines."6 Once established, they then expanded their operations in the new market. Alpina acquired a new plant after
obtaining consumer acceptance. In another case, Mavesa, a
Venezuelan food processor, and Colombia's Noel, followed a
similar start-up strategy.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
See id. at 242.
See Arcor: Receta Dificil, AMERICA ECONOMWA, Apr. 23, 1998, at 20.
See G6mez, supra note 27, at 235.

61. Id.
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Another example of developing business links with local
partners is Sky Latin America LLC, a regional satellite television enterprise based in Miami, which has developed joint
ventures with firms like Organizacoes Globo of Brazil and
Grupo Televisa S.A. of Mexico in order to gain a foothold in
these two Latin countries.62 This has been taken as a first
step towards the expansion within in the region with the aim
that Sky will eventually outdo its competitor-and leader in
the market--Galaxy Latin America. Sky has created independent operations in each country, leaving marketing and sales
strategies to its local partners."
Proliferating mergers and joint ventures are not necessarily the result of a manifest (or implied) intention to monopolize
regional or local markets. There are two reasonable explanations for such operations. First, there may well be a need to
overcome the uncertainty of investing in the newly emerging
markets of Latin America. This need may induce firms wishing
to take advantage of the liberalization in the region to forge
closer business ties with other firms, offering them tacit and
subjective knowledge of the new market, which they would
otherwise require years to develop. Second, these concentrations may occur because of the need to ensure sufficient economies of scale to make the investment profitable. Indeed, the
size of domestic Latin American markets, independently considered, may not support investments above certain levels.
For example, the Sindicato Antioqueio, a Colombian group
representing approximately one hundred independently-owned
firms, and including some of the country's largest and most
advanced retailers, joined Holland's Makro and Venezuela's
Polar in order to bring about Venezuela's largest chain of supermarkets (fifty Cada outlets) and department stores (eight
Maxy's stores).' The new chain of supermarkets and department stores, together with the Makro bulk retail outlets that
are expanding rapidly in Venezuela, provide a powerful, readymade distribution channel for the Sindicato's wide range of
manufacturing firms, including Noel. Once on the brink of
bankruptcy, these firms have been revitalized by the new capi-

62. See Tara Sullivan, El Desafio de Competir: Rompen Esquemas, AIWRICA
ECONOMIA, Apr. 9, 1998, at 51.
63. See id.
64. See G6mez, supra note 27, at 235.
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tal and "knowledge" provided by their new partners. The old
owners, the Cisneros Group, divested themselves of both the
Cada and Maxy's retail networks in order to raise the vast
amount of capital required for their hemisphere-wide entry bid
into satellite television.65
Corporate restructuring may prove decisive in a rapidly
changing business environment, as exemplified by Grupo Hermes.66 This formerly protected Mexican industrial group survived the 1994 recession and foreign competition by selling its
interests in the manufacturing sector and focusing on the energy sector and telecommunications. 6 The group is now the
main shareholder of Grupo Cerrey, which produces energy
plant containers. By restructuring, the group was able to build
on its
previous manufacturing experience of automobile
68
parts.
For complementary investments, some local multinational
companies contract the services of domestic firms
-("outsourcing"), rather than develop internal units or vertical
integration. By doing so, these firms acquire the knowledge
and expertise to develop export sales. For example, Cartonajes
Estrella,a leading carton maker in Mexico, obtained a contract
to supply cups to McDonalds and soon afterwards began servicing the firm's needs in Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Argentina.
Another carton supplier, Convermex, also supplies McDonalds,
as well as KFC, Domino's Pizza and other fast food suppliers
in Mexico and elsewhere in the region. As G6mez indicates,
"[b]y serving as local suppliers of multinationals, these Mexican firms learned how to cater to customers that demand consistent quality, low prices and large volume."69 Another case
is the experience of Alicorp, S. A., a large Peruvian food manufacturing company."0 This company regards its distribution
network system, based on effective outsourcing, as the key to
its success over its competitors. In 1993, the company began an
aggressive expansion plan, which included buying its two most
important rivals, thus reducing costs-payroll was reduced by

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
See Sullivan, supra note 62, at 52.
See id.
See id.
G6mez, supra note 27, at 235.
See Sullivan, supra note 62, at 56.
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43%--and developing a reliable distribution network.7 The
results: in 1997, the company's sales return was estimated at
US$600 million a year, compared to US$120 million in 1993.72
Outsourcing enables Alicorp to reach clients that would otherwise be too expensive to serve, because its distributors have
lower cost structures. In this relationship, Alicorp provides its
distributors with capital, knowhow and access to its network of
clients.73 A similar business strategy explains the success of
Polar, the largest Venezuelan brewery, which has survived
aperturaand foreign competition because of its excellent distribution network system. 4
The pressure of internationalization has forced Latin firms
to either seek alliances or integrate in order to meet the challenge of international competition. A good example of integration is the Mexican cement industry, formerly dominated by
dozens of family-owned companies spread across the country.
Once trade barriers came down, small companies were absorbed by Mexico's Cemex.75 This company is now on par with
the three Swiss, Italian and French multinationals that, together with Cemex, dominate the world cement market.7"
Steel producers provide a contrasting example of alliance.
Firms in this industry have remained largely independent, but
this has not prevented them from developing strategic alliances for solving specific problems, such as the imposition of
dumping duties in foreign jurisdictions.77 Steel producers from
Brazil and Chile were brought into a newly privatized
Argentinian firm to create Aceros Parand, the first steel-producing firm to form part of a regional group.78 In Mexico,
Tamsa entered a strategic alliance with Argentina's Siderca,
which is part of the Parandcomplex.79
Sometimes strong investments in technology may be necessary to reduce labor costs, as the example of Companhia Textil

71. See id.
72. See id. at 56, 57.
73. See id.
74. See AToNTO
FRANCES & LUIS DAVALOS, LA CORPORACIONEU CUATRO
DIZENSIONES EDICISUIS IESA 110 (1992).
75. See G6mez, supra note 27, at 236.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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de Minas Gerais, SA. (Coteminas), a large Brazilian textile
manufacturer illustrates. An investment of US$450 million in
machinery enabled this firm to compete successfully with
Asian rivals, whose labor costs are 50% lower.80
G6mez vividly describes the challenges which lie ahead in
the process of corporate integration in the region: "Early in the
coming century, [it is conceivable that] the food marketer's
dream could well come true: millions of consumers throughout
Latin America that, prompted by a region-wide, satellitebeamed advertising campaign, begin each day drinking the
same brand of juice (or soft drink) and the same breakfast
cereal!""'
Finally, in order to remain efficient (i.e. adapted to the
Latin American setting), these forms of coordination have
encouraged firms not to grow too fast or too much, and not to
adopt values which run counter to conventional business. As
an example of the first situation, Ddvila and Samper relate the
case of Ekare, a Venezuelan child's book publisher, which has
attained world-class stature, based on the excellence and originality of its product brought about by avoiding excessive
growth. 2 To explain the second situation, they quote the case
of BICE, a medium-sized Chilean bank; which is part of a
powerful business group, and has become a leader in fiercely
competitive corporate and institutional banking.8" The success
of this bank, in their opinion, is based on local cultural values;
in particular, a personal selection process built on family unity
and religious values that would be considered "unthinkable" in
a modern business setting.'
To sum up, the evidence presented above supports the
conclusion that businesses regard predictability as essential in
their transactions. As a result, they attempt to increase their
certainty, even at the expense of restricting the possibilities for
action, if that can enhance their expectations of the reliability
of the market where they are planning to invest. One should
not forget that market arrangements are shaped by the structural conditions of the markets involved, and that these condi-

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Sullivan, supra note 62, at 58.
Gimez, supra note 27, at 242.
Ddvila & Samper, supra note 53, at 675.
See id.
See id.
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tions (the technologies involved, legal rules, customs, economies of scale, and others) cannot be dismissed in the appraisal
of such restrictions.
V.

DRAFTING AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY FOR THE PROMOTION OF
BusINEss COMPETITION IN THE CONTEXT OF A MARKET
PROCESS THEORY

Of course, viewing market "restrictive" arrangements as
devices to diminish uncertainty in an evolving world does not
mean that in particular instances entrepreneurs will choose
the most efficient agreement. Again, perfect knowledge is not
assumed; rather, the possibility of making mistakes is always
there. Individuals may eventually choose those arrangements
that suit them better, but they may do so after a learning
process involving costs. Again, from a view where knowledge
constantly changes, nothing ensures that an overall tendency
towards equilibrium should prevail, but it is reasonable to
expect that entrepreneurs will arrange their affairs in an attempt to achieve equilibrium in their particular transactions. 5
85. Economists debate on whether a tendency towards equilibrium leading to
social progress does exist. Guided by Herbert Spencer's notion of progressive social
development, some argue that equilibrium may not be a suitable heuristic appraisal for reality, but it is undeniable that a tendency towards equilibrium does exist;
otherwise, economic theory (explaining certain patterns of conduct) would be meaningless. See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, EntrepreneurialDiscovery and the Competitive
Market Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 60 (1997). See
generally HERBERT SPENCER, FIRST PRINCIPLES (1862). As Moss contends, Alfred

Marshall's vision of the economic process bears this particular mark. Lawrence
Moss, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Economics and Evolution: A Review Article, 4 MARSHALL STUD. BULL. 33-49 (1994) <http://www.cce.unifi.ittrivista/moss.htm>. Other
scholars argue that modern biological reasoning, led by Charles Darwin, is about
evolutionary process; hence, it is about the errors as well as the successes proceeding irreversibly along time's arrow with no teleological goal in sight. There is no
move towards equilibrium; adjustment is made without any consideration for social
progress. This view is advocated by G. Hodgson in the following terms: "in the
biological and the economic context, evolution is not a grand optimizer, or a perfectionist. Evolution is awesome and inspiring, but also messy, stupid and tragic."
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTION: BRINGING LIFE BACK INTO

ECONOMICS 212 (1993). In the realm of economic theory, this perspective is represented in the idea of "disequilibrium," best espoused by G. B. Shackle. See LUDWIG
M. LACHMANN, Professor Shackle on the Economic Significance of Time, in CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE
MARKET ECONOMY 81, 81-93 (Walter E. Grinder ed., 1977). In our opinion, the

argument should distinguish between short term and long term equilibrium. The
first is sought by transacting parties to arrange their affairs so as to suit them,
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In the realm of market transactions, individual transactions may appear in the short run to limit the freedom of others to enter into a given market, or to act in a particular way.
However, in the long run, these arrangements will favor the
necessary predictability to invest in new markets in developing
innovations and new products. This clearly shows that equilibrium and social efficiency are not necessarily synonymous, as
they appear under mainstream economics.
In the long run, achieving equilibrium is not necessarily a
precondition for attaining social efficiency. Efficiency, rather, is
linked to the coordination of individuals for achieving their
plans. For this reason, the efficiency of social rules (laws, customary rights, etc.) is not associated with a given resource
allocation devised by an enlightened social observer, but rather, with the possibilities that it offers to individuals for coordinating their conducts mutually according to their goals. Property rights, freedom of contract, protection of intellectual property rights and the like appear as preconditions for achieving
such coordination.
Advocating against antitrust policy does not belittle a
government's involvement in promoting competition. On the
contrary, it is unthinkable to imagine economic transactions
occurring in an institution-free setting. Markets can only function within a defined framework of rights, and this is the main
responsibility of governments. Yet, the preceding caveats
should immediately make us aware that such intervention
bears a different sign and purpose. The question, then, is what
sort of competition policy is compatible with market functioning?
Political authorities can foster several proactive national,
regional and local level government initiatives aimed at making business environments much clearer and more predictable.

albeit not for allocative purposes, but for achieving a better coordination of their
individual positions. Individuals can identify such equilibrium from an ex-ante
perspective, but that does not ensure that they will be right from an ex-post perspective. In the long run, the essence of the problem is different, and equilibrium
cannot be taken for granted. The evolutionary process may lead to cumulative
individual "mistakes" that will be reflected in the flaws of the rules developed to
enable coordination of individuals. Moreover, the long term perspective will show
how from the ex-post appraisal, individuals may not always reach optima. In sum,
it is futile to judge individual short term transactions through rules conceived to
judge from a long term perspective.
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The goal is to create a favorable setting where managerial
innovation, creativity, and the emergence of valuable market
information-in the form of improvements, new knowledge,
technologies and processes-can develop.
To address this goal, it is necessary to eliminate the sources of interference created at the public and private level. These
sources could impose upon society severe inefficiencies in the
form of misallocation of resources, and even more importantly,
in the interference they posit to the emergence of new valuable
knowledge and information. For this reason, "public interest"
demands a clear definition of an individual's right to prevent
unauthorized subjects (public and private "free riders") from
obtaining undeserved benefits from the investments made by
legitimate owners. This is a task that governments can perform themselves, or allow86individuals to perform through private means of "exclusion."
First, a more effective definition of individual rights is
necessary to allow firms to know the extent of their actual
access to social resources. Therefore, it is necessary for entrepreneurs to have reliable expectations about the conditions
within which they can acquire property rights.
Second, a proper delimitation in the sphere of individual
rights would encompass not only clarity in the initial assignment, but also clearer rules on the transmission of such rights.
In other words, entrepreneurs must possess reliable expectations about the conditions under which they can trade their
property rights under contractual arrangements.
The adverse effects of a poor definition and enforcement of

86. According to game theory models, free riding generates an incentive to
develop Prisoner Dilemma's situations where some parties seek to gain advantages
from cheating the rest; these situations call for intervention to discipline members
of the group. See AVINASH Y_ DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGI-

CALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BuSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 89
(1991). The application of game theory models into the law is explored in DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994). The view of the phenomenon of free riding under antitrust policy is ambiguous. For example, this
policy subjects exclusive contractual arrangements excluding "free riders" (e.g.,
exclusive distribution or supply agreements) to a rule of reason analysis, in order
to determine their restrictive effects. Therefore, the legality of these agreements
will not depend so much on their economic beneficial effects, as on the concentration they generate in the market, by excluding alternative sources of rivalry (e.g.,
non-exclusive suppliers or distributors). It is overlooked that by their very nature,
these agreements are aimed to exclude ("free riding") competitors from the market.
Once more, antitrust analysis reveals itself as lacking touch with reality.
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property rights resulting from administrative discretion are
even more evident within weak institutional settings, such as
those found in developing countries." As Eggertsson stated:
Weak institutions are usually associated with a weak state.
In some circumstances various decentralized groups (trading
companies, guilds) have taken over the role of the state and
succeeded in providing stable property rights, but a system
based entirely on decentralized property rights is unlikely to
provide a foundation for a modern industrial economy."
For this reason, it is essential to control government discretion over trade and economic transactions. Administrative
discretion over judging the "fairness" of contracts harbors multiple forms of trade restriction leading to uncertainty, lessening
business expectations about the initial assignment of rights. In
this context, it is clear that as far as antitrust policies are
concerned, they must reconsider their central object of regulation. Conduct currently prohibited under these statutes (price
fixing, output restrictions, exclusive dealings, resale price
maintenance, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures and so
on) may be considered under a dynamic view of markets as
conveying necessary restrictions of freedom to market participants that they voluntarily enter into for reducing business
uncertainty. Therefore, they should not be condemned under
an unrealistic structural appraisal of markets, but allowed.
Finally, government intervention to protect dynamic competition and innovation should focus on protecting the content
of individuals' spheres of action in cases where initial entitlement becomes challenged due to insufficient clarity in the
assignment. This results in two or more entrepreneurs holding
legitimate expectations about the extent of their respective
entitlements over a disputed social resource. For this reason, a
real competition policy should implement efficient dispute
settlement mechanisms allowing the elimination of any source
of interference and uncertainty in the initial allocation or
transfer of rights. An efficient dispute settlement system would
allow the solution of ex-post conflicts over the use of resources

87. See Thrdinn Eggertsson, The Economics of Institutions in Transition Econo-

mies, in INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 19, 22 (Salvatore Schiavo-Campo ed., 1994).

88. Id. at 25.
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due to a poor ex-ante identification and assignment of rights.
Much of this institutional transparency could be attained
through effective "competition advocacy" aimed at eliminating
the sources of government interference upon a clearer definition of property and contractual rights, and secondly, through
challenging business misbehavior which can diminish the expectations of individuals due to confusion introduced in the
entitlements.
Competition advocacy is particularly important in Latin
America because of the former experience of misled government intervention in the region, which is responsible for the
current competition and innovation problems. Competition
agencies are increasingly considering this sort of policy enforcement, but regretfully they are ill-suited to go too far in
these activities since they lack the proper legal powers to coerce government agencies beyond mere recommendations and
providing opinions. This is not surprising since the logic justifying this "competition advocacy" is completely divorced from
that which led to the emergence of antitrust statutes. In this
regard, antitrust provisions emerged from a recognition that
"markets fail" to deliver social good, whereas competition advocacy is justified on the basis that "government fails" to provide
for suitable "official" institutions within which to work out
social and economic interaction.8 9
Competition advocacy could adopt many modalities. For
example, it could entail forming a public prosecutorial agency
entrusted with the protection of economic rights, as well as
official initiatives to deregulate the economic process. It could
also entail a clarification or a limitation of those conditions
triggering the alibi of "public interest," which has always invited obstructive government. There are many forms in which
such initiatives could be implemented, provided they include a
clear commitment to clarify the institutional framework officially and managerially that evolved.
In addition, government intervention should ensure that
market transactions are not adopted under conditions of violence, duress or fraud. For this reason, it is necessary to en-

89. See C. Curiel, Elementos para la Aplicaci6n de Compencia en Economfas
en Transici6n: La Experiencia en Venezuela, Paper presented at the seminar
Politicas de Competencia en America Latina y el Caribe (Oct. 23-24, 1995) (sponsored by UNCTAD and held in Caracas, Venezuela).
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sure that individuals preserve their expectations about the
identity of those with whom they trade. This is the rationale
for pursuing a policy against conduct that is regarded as an
"unfair" expression of competition, in the sense that it misleads
the public.
Consider the legislation dealing with intellectual property.
This legislation aims to identify and protect certain sorts of
(intellectual) entitlements over things, the intangible nature of
which makes them difficult to grasp, let alone to protect legally. In these cases, governments explore the difficult task of
detecting the infringement of these rights, the legal qualification of which makes them particularly subtle. For example,
how is it possible to determine that a product has been reproduced similarly enough to create confusion in the consumers'
perceptions about the identity of the rightful producer? How is
it possible to establish that a negative opinion spread about a
competitor's product constitutes the denigration of his reputation and therefore, a legal wrong? The delimitation of individual rights is frequently difficult and therefore, requires particular care and commitment from the government in its enforcement.
These elements provide the blueprint for the formulation
of an adequate competition policy: to ensure economic freedom
to market participants in international trade, in order to provide them effective market access which is frequently denied in
order to satisfy the interests of particular groups seeking protection from international trade. This sort of intervention
would warrant positive results for the promotion of competition, in a more effective way than chasing elusive monopolistic
practices.
In sum, the goal of an alternative competition policy in
international trade is to enhance the predictability of market
participants through the reduction of uncertainty regarding
their individual rights. Such protection would do much more
for enhancing individual rights and trade than any well-intentioned antitrust scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Determining whether antitrust policy is "convenient" for
promoting competition in Latin America cannot be deduced by
simply appealing to the linguistic interpretation of the stat-
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utes. It is not possible to appeal to the traditional method of
legal science in order to examine the implications of enforcing
antitrust regulations in Latin America. The traditional method
of legal science is formalistic in the sense that it views social
rules as simple instruments emerging from those bodies formally acknowledged as law-making entities. This method is
based on the literal interpretation of written rules enacted
through codification. It has emerged as a by-product of the
influence of logical positivism in social sciences since the midnineteenth century." The method inadequately casts light on
the reality of developing countries, where official authorities
clearly possess limited legitimacy in their law-making activities, which are frequently surpassed by social interaction.9 '
In addition, the conventional legal method of analysis is
insufficient to explain the complexity of social interaction in
creating market rules. Adopting a formalistic approach to the
analysis of social reality is not only inconvenient but also improper, since it excludes by definition the non-legal substratum
of ideas implemented through government mechanisms. Hence,
legal institutions may be more fully understood by using a
method of analysis which enables the observer to apprehend
the richness of those ideas in shaping government, in a way

90. From this period, social science lost all significant contact with political

philosophy and social scientists concentrated on achieving value-neutrality in science. A more precise conception of science emerged, focusing on causal laws and
quantitative methods. Separate disciplines of political economy, history, philosophy,
and law emerged within more precise technical boundaries. Making positive law
the central focus for study required a change in legal method. As a result of this
intellectual influence, the methodology of legal science changed dramatically, from
an historical, sociological and explanatory approach to a mechanical one, mostly
concerned with explaining legal rules in terms of "facts." "Since science was engaged with the [factual] realm of inquiry a science of law would, it was assumed,
need to be erected on a foundation of fact. This objective became the quest of
legal positivism, which was pioneered by Bentham and refined by John Austin."
LOUGHLIN, supra note 4, at 20. Consequently, formalism remained, in the sense of
law being "a self-contained body of rules which operates by means of a distinctive
system of the conceptual thought." Id. at 22. The formal classification approach to
public law that emerged had achieved a pre-eminent status by the turn of the
century and has remained the dominant method ever since. As Loughlin states:
"although Austinian positivism is no longer the primary theory, Austin's method
remains dominant." Id. It is this paradigmatic way of understanding social rules
that the conventional legal method favored and which provided the setting for the
emergence of antitrust regulations.
91. On this question, see ROBERT BALDWIN, RULES AND GOVERNMENT 59-121
(1995).
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that a formal appraisal cannot reveal. As Baldwin contends,
arguing the 'legal" nature of government rules is irrelevant for
the purposes of exploring their normative force, and their implications within society. 92 It is necessary to transcend the
limitations imposed by the positivistic distinction between
"fact" and "value," particularly in the realm of law.
Understanding social rules properly requires an alternate
interpretation of approximate reality. This is particularly useful in the analysis of public law because it overturns the vacuum of conventional legal analysis, which merely focuses on
determining what internal connections the observer can construct between rules belonging to a predefined set of legislation. In this way, an alternative method could provide a clearer
understanding of public regulations by exploring more closely
their "values," thus linking their legitimacy to their implications within society.
The analysis of regulation, around which the discussion of
competition policy revolves, cannot avoid linking the analysis
of reality to certain guiding values. This is inevitable, if the
aim of the scientific quest is to explore the logical basis for the
interpretation of social facts. As Demsetz contended, it is ideas
that provide the tools for the interpretation of facts rather
than facts that shape ideas. 93 This is clearly so in economics,
and particularly in discussions on competition.9 4
Promoting competition and innovation is crucial for developing countries to spur growth, but easy answers are not available yet. Today, policy makers are less optimistic than a generation ago, but this conviction has also made them more realistic about the complexity of the problem, and therefore, the
changes that are necessary to undertake to achieve this goal.
In this regard, policy makers are progressively shifting
from their former "social engineering," which purported to
change market outcomes according to some vague "development" standards, into a new "paradigm" of regulation, which is

92. Id. at 7.
93. Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 164 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1996).
94. See id. In this field, it is not possible to dissociate fact from value, since,
as Berlin stressed, human beings (whose interaction constitutes the subject matter
of the social sciences) are self-interpreting creatures. See Berlin, supra note 9, at
13 and accompanying text.
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increasingly acknowledging the need to support market mechanisms in order to create wealth and progress.
The above considerations should clarify how much antitrust theory is divorced from promoting innovation and entrepreneurship. By protecting a structural notion of competition,
antitrust policy is more concerned about preserving a minimum number of firms within a given industry, rather than
creating the conditions for any interested and alert entrepreneur to discover new valuable information and knowledge,
either through rivalry or through market cooperation.
Machlup explains the sources of this confusion: "The confusion is understandable: where there are many sellers already,
why should there not easily be more sellers when profits lure?
In actual practice easy entry into a trade and large numbers in
the trade go well together."95 However, "even if a large number of sellers and an augmentable number of sellers seem to be
closely correlated, logically the two things are completely divorced from each other. And, it will be seen, (they are concepts) of very different nature; indeed, they belong to different
spheres of thought."9 6
In sum, antitrust theory confuses the causes of the complex process whereby firms are at times induced to make investments to gain a "competitive edge" vis-A-vis their competitors, and at times prefer to cooperate with them to avoid more
costly uncertainty.
Under an alternative institutional perspective, markets
are embedded within the social institutions where they grow,
but certainly policy action can improve their functioning; in
particular, governments can provide for more certainty which
would enhance the legitimate expectations of market players. 7 This is the essence of governmental restrictions upon
trade, competition and innovation.
Of course, these perceptions are influenced and even built
upon by the way they grasp the real world. These paradigms
make up for their interpretation of social reality. This is cru-

95. Fritz Machlup, Competition, Pliopoly and Profit, ECONOMICA, Feb. 1942, at
1.
96. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added). See also GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN
UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 92-93 (1988).
97. See generally 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE
MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976).
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cial for legal enforcement. Depending on the paradigm relied
upon, one behavior will appear either as a "market failure"
deserving "corrections" (i.e., public intervention ruling a different outcome from the one it would have prevailed under strict
market conditions), or an "institutional failure," in need of
correction through policy action. Here the correction would
indeed require policy action, but in the sense of reinforcing
markets, not making them more transparent. The point, however, is that a decision among paradigms leaves aside all discussion about conflicting theories within each paradigm. Therefore, it is irrelevant for these purposes to argue about the validity of the empirical evidence in support of such conflicting
theories.
Instead, the problem centers around identifying which
method examines the real world more accurately. Equilibrium,
the most frequently used method of deducing economic "laws"
based on the appraisal of empirical evidence provides a poor
description of social phenomena. This is particularly true in
the area of competition, because the corresponding models, no
matter how many variables they include, cannot deal with
them all simultaneously. The evolving essence of information
that markets disclose gives market competition a dynamism
which cannot be appraised under such a method properly. In
fact, as Kirzner contends, the method by definition denies its
very essence." Consequently, as Sowell indicates, those supporting antitrust have scored a "verbal coup," by confusing the
meaning of "competition" as related to market share controlled
by certain firms "as if they were discussing prospective behavior rather than retrospective numbers."9 9
There are conflicting views about the method of social
scientific inquiry, but some views are more realistic than others. It is clear that the role of institutions cannot be ignored,
as it has been from the conventional neo-classical analysis
nourishing antitrust predictions and theories. A constructive

98. ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, HOW MARKETS WORK: DISEQUILIBRIUM, ENTREPRENEUR-

SHIP AND DISCOvERY 21-30 (IEA Hobart Paper No. 133, 1987). McNulty also emphasized how the conventional notion of neoclassical competition is at odds with
the one that entrepreneurs face in the market. See Paul J. McNulty, Economic
Theory and the Meaning of Competition, in THE COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (Y. Brozen
ed., 1975).
99. THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 205 (1980).
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and more profound perspective must not attempt to isolate
social reality and market functioning from those sets of rules
that enable them to function. Constructing public policies on
the basis of ideal worlds can only lead to contradictions and
institutional failures. The theoretical shortcomings and the
enforcement experience of antitrust policy shows the possible
consequences of these rules as applied to international trade
relations. In fact, more than anything, the concerns about
restrictive trade and business practices in international trade
relations show, in the words of Godek, "an unhealthy anxiety
about the imagined ills of capitalism. " "'
One must be especially wary of the claims of scholars,
particularly (but not exclusively, it is fair to say) in the legal
field, who take these policies at their face value without regarding the economic theory and the implications behind them
and the results of such implementation. It is impossible to
disagree wholeheartedly with Ackerman, when he sarcastically
put the matter in these terms: "When they speak so resonantly
of 'public policy,' do lawyers have the slightest idea what
they're talking about?"''
VII.
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